EU top court judges hold shares in firms they may rule over, raising transparency concerns — UnionPress

Investigative reporting finds more than a third of CJEU judges own stakes in companies that appear before the court, prompting calls for stricter conflict‑of‑interest rules.

Investigate Europe has uncovered that a sizable share of the judges and advocate‑generals of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) own financial interests in companies that have been, or could be, parties to cases before the court. The findings, based on an analysis of publicly available declarations of interest, show that 36 of the 100 judges and advocate‑generals have declared holdings in 124 different entities, ranging from oil majors to technology firms.

The CJEU, based in Luxembourg, is the EU's highest court and its rulings can compel member‑state governments to amend legislation, force multinational corporations to pay billions in fines, and shape the regulatory landscape for half a billion European citizens. Its judges are therefore expected to adhere to the highest standards of impartiality, as set out in the court's code of conduct, which obliges members to avoid any situation that could give rise to a conflict of interest or even the appearance of one.

According to the documents examined, more than 40 % of current judges and advocate‑generals have declared private financial interests. The portfolio of declared assets includes stakes in oil giants such as Eni and TotalEnergies, aerospace leaders Airbus and Boeing, the e‑commerce platform Amazon, and pharmaceutical companies including AstraZeneca, BioNTech and Merck. Real‑estate and infrastructure holdings, as well as investments in banks ranging from European institutions like Erste Bank and Swedbank to US conglomerates such as Berkshire Hathaway, also appear in the disclosures.

Five judges account for roughly half of all declared interests. They are Ramona Frendo of Malta, Lauri Madise of Estonia, Tuula Pynnä of Finland, Juliane Kokott of Germany, and Andreas Kumin of Austria. The size and exact nature of their holdings are not disclosed in the public versions of the declarations, which only list the entities in which they have an interest.

The investigation identified several instances where judges sat on panels that decided cases involving firms in which they held shares. One high‑profile example involves German advocate‑general Juliane Kokott, a noted authority on competition law. Kokott's most recent public declaration lists modest holdings, five shares each in AstraZeneca and Merck, and seven in BioNTech. In 2019 she was assigned a case pitting French drugmaker Servier against the European Commission over a hypertension treatment. The case was decided in 2022, after Kokott had acquired the pharmaceutical shares she now declares.

Kokott defended the arrangement, saying she had fully complied with the court's rules on impartiality and conflict of interest. She argued that her opinion in the Servier case was not favourable to the pharmaceutical industry, noting that she had concluded the agreements between Servier and generic manufacturers constituted illegal restrictions of competition, a stance that, in her view, could not have boosted the share price of the companies she owned.

Another example concerns Belgian judge Geert de Baere of the General Court, who participated in a panel ruling on a dispute involving BNP Paribas Fortis, the Belgian subsidiary of the French banking group. De Baere does not own shares in BNP, but he maintains a current and savings account with the bank and an investment portfolio managed by a third‑party provider that includes shares of third‑party companies. The case concerned a bill issued by an EU banking agency, and the court ultimately ruled in favour of BNP.

In both instances, the judges argued that no material benefit accrued from the decisions and that they had recused themselves from any direct conflict, as required by the court's internal procedures. However, critics point out that the perception of impartiality is just as important as actual bias, especially when rulings can move market prices by significant margins.

The CJEU's own rules place the onus on judges to self‑declare any potential conflict and to notify the president of the court when a case is assigned that could raise concerns. The president then decides whether to take the declaration into account when allocating cases. There is no external verification of the declarations, no published reasoning for the allocation decisions, and no requirement for the court to make past declarations publicly available.

Professor Alberto Alemanno, a long‑time commentator on EU judicial transparency, described the system as "almost entirely based on self‑assessment". He warned that without independent scrutiny, the process can leave room for both actual and perceived conflicts to slip through unnoticed.

When asked about the lack of external checks, a spokesperson for the CJEU replied that judges are private citizens who must decide how to manage their personal assets, and that owning shares is permissible provided it does not affect the administration of justice. The spokesperson added that, to date, no judge has been forced to recuse themselves on the grounds of a conflict of interest.

The court also declined several requests from Investigate Europe for additional information on how cases are allocated and for historical versions of the declarations, citing privacy concerns and the need to protect judges from external pressure. The European Ombudsman, Teresa Anjinho, announced that she would open an inquiry into the court's refusal to publish past declarations, and said she would meet with CJEU officials in September to discuss the matter.

When a supreme court rules on a case involving a publicly listed company, the decision can instantly affect the firm's share price. For example, a ruling that confirms a competition violation can lead to hefty fines and a drop in market value, while a decision that dismisses a complaint can cause a surge. Given the scale of the EU market, even a single judgment can move billions of euros in equity value.

Transparency advocates argue that the current arrangement creates a structural risk that could undermine public confidence in the EU's judicial system. They point to the European Court of Human Rights, which moved to nine‑year non‑renewable mandates for its judges in 2010 precisely to avoid the perception that judges might be swayed by the prospect of reappointment.

In the EU, judges at the CJEU are appointed for renewable six‑year terms by the governments of the member states that nominated them. Critics say this creates a "sword of Damocles" over judges, who may feel pressure to align with the preferences of their home governments if they wish to secure a second term. Yale researcher Carles Aulés‑Blancher has called for longer, non‑renewable mandates to reduce this pressure.

Former Luxembourg minister François Biltgen, now a CJEU judge, illustrated the potential for national bias. Biltgen, who served as a minister for 14 years and was a close ally of former EU Commission president Jean‑Claude Juncker, sat on a panel that ruled on a €250 million tax dispute involving Amazon and Luxembourg. The court sided with Amazon, effectively allowing the company to keep a tax advantage that had been set up while Biltgen was still in government. Biltgen rejected any suggestion of conflict, saying that the case concerned the tax authority, not the government, and that he had no current political contacts.

Legal scholars note that while it is not prohibited for judges to sit on panels involving their home country, the CJEU tries to avoid assigning them the role of rapporteur, the judge who drafts the preliminary opinion, in such cases. Nevertheless, data from the IUROPA research project shows that judges acted as rapporteurs in roughly 30 cases directly involving their own nation between 2018 and 2024.

Transparency International EU senior policy officer Shari Hinds said that the court's reliance on self‑assessment leaves "open questions on whether the consequences of perceived conflicts of interest were fully considered when cases were assigned". She urged the CJEU to adopt a more robust, external verification mechanism.

Assistant professor Silje Hermansen of the University of Copenhagen argued that judges should be required to divest from any holdings that could be affected by their rulings, or at least place them in blind trusts. "When a publicly‑traded company wins in court, its stock price often jumps immediately," she explained. "The court should consider a reform where judges sell their shares before taking office. You will never find anyone in the EU institutions who is paid more than these people."

General Court president Marc van der Woude recalled that in his previous private‑law practice, colleagues were barred from owning direct shares in companies that might become clients. He suggested that a similar rule could be introduced for the CJEU.

Beyond individual holdings, the investigation highlighted procedural opacity. Almost a third of the declarations on the court's website were older than three years, despite the code of conduct requiring updates whenever a change occurs. After the investigation was announced, the court uploaded refreshed versions for more than 35 judges, but several still lacked dates or were missing altogether.

Critics also note that the 255 Committee, the body that vets candidates for appointment, operates behind closed doors. Its composition, seven European jurists, often former CJEU members, has been criticised for lacking transparency and for potential conflicts of interest, especially after a 2024 report revealed that a senior FIFA official sat on the committee while the court was handling multiple cases involving the football governing body.

The European Ombudsman's inquiry could lead to a recommendation that the CJEU publish all historical declarations and adopt clearer definitions of conflict of interest, perhaps aligning with OECD guidelines that distinguish between actual and perceived conflicts. The court may also be pressured to adopt external oversight of case allocation, similar to the procedures used by national supreme courts in several EU states.

In the meantime, the public debate is likely to intensify. As the EU moves towards deeper integration in areas such as digital markets, climate policy and competition law, the CJEU's rulings will become ever more consequential for corporations and citizens alike. Ensuring that the court's judges are seen to be impartial, and are in fact impartial, will be essential for maintaining trust in the EU's legal order.

For now, the investigation has sparked a broader conversation about the balance between judges' private rights and the public's right to an unbiased judiciary. Whether the CJEU will respond with substantive reforms or continue to rely on self‑regulation remains to be seen, but the scrutiny from journalists, civil‑society groups and European institutions suggests that the status quo is under increasing pressure.