Russia's fledgling Rassvet satellite network already offers brief coverage over Ukraine — UnionPress

Despite having only a few dozen satellites, Russia's Rassvet system can provide two daily communication windows over Ukrainian territory, prompting concerns about future military use and counter‑measures.

Russia has begun to demonstrate that its home‑grown Rassvet satellite internet constellation can already reach Ukrainian airspace, albeit for short periods each day. According to a Ukrainian defence‑technology site, the system creates at least two "communications windows" of roughly one to one‑and‑a‑half hours, a capability that could be exploited by Moscow's armed forces if the network is fully operational.

The revelation comes as the Rassvet programme, often dubbed "Russian Starlink", moves from experimental launches toward a larger, more ambitious constellation. The project is intended to give the Kremlin an independent high‑speed data link for the military, remote regions of the Arctic and occupied territories, reducing reliance on Western commercial services such as SpaceX's Starlink.

Since the first test flights in 2023, Russia has placed a total of 21 satellites into low‑Earth orbit, according to the Satellitemap database. The first batch of 16 satellites was launched in March 2024, followed by a second batch of the same size in July. A further 16 satellites are expected to reach orbit later this year, with launch windows projected for October or November.

Analysts note that the constellation is still far from the 200‑250 satellites required for continuous, stable coverage. By contrast, SpaceX operates close to 11,000 low‑orbit satellites, delivering near‑global broadband connectivity. Russian officials have set a long‑term target of roughly 1,000 Rassvet satellites by 2035, but the current launch cadence, roughly one batch every three months, would need to accelerate dramatically to meet that ambition.

Volodymyr Stepanets, a satellite‑communications specialist quoted by the Ukrainian site Militarnij, said the existing satellites already form a "chain with good coverage" that provides two daily passes over Ukraine. He added that the actual number of passes could be higher, depending on orbital geometry and ground‑terminal availability.

Serhii Beskrestnov, another Ukrainian expert, warned that "200 to 250 satellites in orbit would be needed for continuous and stable data transmission". He stressed that the present configuration can only support intermittent links, which limits its usefulness for sustained command‑and‑control operations.

If the Russian armed forces manage to field portable ground terminals that can lock onto Rassvet signals, they could equip drones such as the Geran loitering munition with real‑time data links. This would reduce the need for signal‑boosting equipment in Belarus, a point of contention for Kyiv, and could improve the coordination of artillery, electronic‑reconnaissance and unmanned aerial assets.

The state‑run channel Two Majors suggested a broader vision: a unified network that links reconnaissance platforms, radar stations and artillery crews, delivering live battlefield intelligence across the front line. Such integration would echo the way Ukrainian forces currently rely on Starlink to guide Hornet attack drones and coordinate strikes in occupied territories.

While the Rassvet system is still in its infancy, its development raises questions for European defence planners. A satellite network that can be switched on over a contested area could alter the balance of electronic warfare in the region, especially if Russia expands coverage to the Arctic and other strategic zones.

EU member states that host NATO radar and early‑warning installations may need to reassess the vulnerability of their own communications infrastructure. The prospect of a parallel Russian satellite network operating alongside commercial constellations could complicate de‑confliction efforts and increase the risk of inadvertent interference.

Ukrainian analysts have already begun debating how to neutralise the emerging threat. Defence Express, a Kyiv‑based outlet, noted that anti‑satellite technology has existed since the Cold War, but warned that shooting down modern satellites creates hazardous debris that can endanger other space assets.

Black Swan, a Telegram channel focused on Russian military technology, argued that a more practical approach would be to jam the signal in a limited area, disable ground gateways or block terminals. The channel estimates that fewer than ten ground stations would be needed to cripple the network, a relatively low‑cost solution compared with kinetic strikes.

Such electronic‑counter‑measure strategies align with broader EU initiatives to develop resilient satellite‑communication capabilities and to safeguard critical infrastructure from hostile interference.

Militarnij projects that, if Russia maintains its current launch rhythm, a fourth batch of satellites could be placed in orbit by March 2027. Continuous coverage over Ukraine might then be achievable by early 2028, giving the Russian military a reliable, sovereign communications backbone.

At that point, the Kremlin could potentially use Rassvet for a range of tasks: coordinating artillery fire, guiding unmanned systems, and maintaining secure links with forces stationed in occupied Donbas cities such as Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, which have become increasingly untenable for civilians.

For the European Union, the emergence of a Russian satellite network underscores the importance of investing in its own civilian and defence‑grade space infrastructure. Initiatives like the EU Space Programme and the European Defence Fund aim to reduce dependence on non‑European providers, ensuring that critical communications remain under democratic control.

The Rassvet effort reflects a wider trend of great‑power competition in low‑Earth orbit. China's Hongyun constellation and the United States' Space Development Agency projects illustrate how satellite constellations are increasingly viewed as strategic assets rather than commercial curiosities.

In this environment, the ability to field a sovereign communications network is seen as essential for national security. Russian officials have framed Rassvet as a safeguard against what they describe as "Western digital hegemony", arguing that a domestic system is necessary for the country's sovereignty.

Critics, however, point out that the resources devoted to building a parallel network could be redirected toward pressing domestic needs, such as modernising the power grid, improving broadband access in remote Russian regions, or addressing the economic hardships faced by ordinary citizens.

For workers in the EU, the story highlights the growing importance of satellite‑based services in everyday life, from remote work to telemedicine, and the need for robust regulatory frameworks that protect consumers from monopolistic practices and ensure that critical infrastructure remains resilient in the face of geopolitical tensions.

As the Rassvet constellation expands, both Kyiv and Brussels will be watching closely. The next few years will determine whether the system remains a limited experimental tool or evolves into a full‑scale communications platform capable of shaping the conduct of war on the ground and the balance of power in the wider European security arena.