Ukrainian drones knock out two key bridges near Mariupol, forcing Russia to rely on makeshift crossings — UnionPress

Three upgraded FP‑2 drones destroyed a highway bridge and a river crossing in occupied southern Ukraine, highlighting a shift toward low‑cost, high‑payload UAVs in the war.

Ukrainian forces used three medium‑range FP‑2 drones to bring down two strategic bridges near Mariupol, dealing a blow to Russian supply lines in the occupied south. The attacks, confirmed by satellite imagery and on‑the‑ground footage, show that Ukraine can achieve significant disruption without relying on expensive Western cruise missiles.

The first bridge, on the R‑280 road at Novoazovsk, collapsed into the Hruzkyi Yelanchyk River after the drones struck the main deck. The second, a four‑lane crossing over the Malyi Kalchyk (known locally as the Kalka) on the Mariupol‑Donetsk highway, suffered a 90‑metre section collapse in both directions. Both bridges had been rebuilt or repaired by Russian engineers after earlier damage, and their loss will force the occupiers to use pontoon structures or shallow‑water embankments as temporary solutions.

Initial speculation suggested a cruise missile might have been involved, but Russian investigators recovered debris from FP‑2 drones at the Novoazovsk site. The owner of the drone‑manufacturing firm Fire Point, Denys Shtilierman, posted a photo on social media with the caption "3FP2", confirming that three of his machines carried out the strike.

Shtilierman explained in May that the FP‑2, originally a medium‑range reconnaissance platform, had been re‑engineered to carry up to 200 kg of explosives and to fly a distance of 370 km. The upgrade involved a larger wing and a reinforced airframe, turning the UAV into a low‑cost alternative to guided bombs. By comparison, Russian Geran‑type loitering munitions typically carry 40-90 kg, while the British‑made Storm Shadow cruise missile carries a 450 kg warhead. The FP‑2 therefore delivers roughly half the payload of a Storm Shadow at a fraction of the price.

Analysts at the RAND Corporation, including Michael Bohnert, have noted that the larger warheads are a key factor in the increased lethality of Ukrainian UAV strikes. The FP‑1, a longer‑range cousin, can now bear 105 kg, while the FP‑2's 200 kg payload is sufficient to inflict structural failure on bridges that are not built to military‑grade specifications.

Russian media outlet Military Informant reported that the bridges were "not particularly robust" and that a series of precise aerial bombs, essentially the FP‑2s, were enough to either seriously damage or completely destroy them. The outlet added that shallow water levels at the river crossings could allow the Russians to construct temporary embankments, but such fixes would take time and resources.

The destroyed bridges sit on the main land corridor linking Russia to Crimea via occupied southern Ukraine. The Novoazovsk bridge on route R‑280 is a vital link for the movement of troops, ammunition and fuel. Its loss forces Russian convoys to detour onto a bypass road that adds at least an hour to travel time, according to Ukrainian analyst Petro Andriushchenko. The Mariupol‑Donetsk crossing, which carries traffic between the two major cities, now requires a longer, less secure route, potentially stretching supply lines by another hour.

Russia has responded by building pontoon bridges and shallow‑water embankments, a pattern observed earlier on the Genichesk‑Arabat Spit route to Crimea. Satellite images released by Radio Svoboda journalist Mark Krutov show two new structures, a floating pontoon bridge and an embankment, erected alongside the damaged bridge near Henichesk. Krutov argues that striking a bridge while its replacement is under construction is more effective than waiting for the replacement to be completed, because the makeshift structures are easier to target.

Andriushchenko echoed this view, suggesting that Ukrainian forces should aim to hit bridges at the moment the Russians are building alternatives. "It is easier to prevent construction than to destroy the replacement later," he wrote. The logic is that temporary bridges and embankments lack the robustness of permanent structures and can be damaged with smaller payloads, further slowing Russian logistics.

While Ukraine is focusing on disrupting Russian transport routes, Moscow is grappling with its own fuel shortages. Reuters sources report that two tankers carrying more than 60,000 tonnes of petrol from India are already en route to Russian ports. The Kremlin has indicated a target of 400,000 tonnes per month, but summer consumption in Russia averages 110,000 tonnes per day, meaning the Indian deliveries would cover less than four days of demand.

Additional shipments are expected from Kazakhstan, 50,000 tonnes slated for July and August as "humanitarian aid", and from Belarus, though the exact volumes remain unclear. The shortfall underscores Russia's reliance on foreign fuel imports after sanctions and wartime damage limited domestic production and refining capacity.

Compounding the fuel issue, Ukrainian forces struck the Kstovo refinery in the Nizhny Novgorod region, igniting a large fire that was captured on video. The attack illustrates Kyiv's strategy of targeting Russian energy infrastructure to exacerbate logistical constraints on the front lines.

In the days following the bridge strikes, Russia launched one of the heaviest aerial assaults on Kyiv in months. Over a 24‑hour period, Russian forces fired 496 drones, 34 Kh‑101 cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, four Kh‑59 missiles and a mixed salvo of Iskander‑M ballistic missiles and Zircon hypersonic weapons. Ukrainian air‑defence systems intercepted 476 drones (a 96 % success rate) and downed the majority of the cruise missiles, but the ballistic missiles caused the most damage.

At least 17 civilians were killed and more than 80 injured in the capital. Damage was recorded at 28 sites, including residential blocks, a major electronics retailer's warehouse and critical infrastructure. Video footage showed a large crater in front of a heavily damaged apartment building, attributed to an Iskander‑M strike.

Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha appealed to European partners for accelerated delivery of air‑defence systems, stating that "this is our main request after the night of horrors that Kyiv has lived through." The plea reflects ongoing concerns that Ukraine's defensive capabilities are stretched by the frequency and intensity of Russian missile barrages.

The successful use of low‑cost, high‑payload drones by Ukraine raises questions for European defence planners. Traditional procurement models that focus on expensive, high‑tech missiles may need to be complemented by investments in affordable UAV technologies that can be produced quickly and in large numbers.

European Union member states have already begun discussions on joint drone development programmes, aiming to reduce reliance on external suppliers and to provide allies with adaptable strike options. The Ukrainian experience demonstrates that a relatively inexpensive platform can achieve strategic effects when equipped with larger warheads and employed against soft targets such as bridges and supply routes.

At the same time, the attacks on Kyiv highlight the continued threat posed by Russian ballistic and hypersonic missiles. NATO's recent decision to accelerate the deployment of allied air‑defence batteries to Eastern Europe reflects a recognition that existing systems must be supplemented to counter a broader spectrum of threats.

According to the open‑source Oryx project, which tracks visually confirmed losses, Russian forces lost 23,703 pieces of heavy equipment by 29 June, including 4,407 tanks, of which 3,310 were destroyed in combat. Ukrainian forces reported 11,629 losses, including 1,437 tanks, with 1,099 destroyed. The data, while not exhaustive, underscores the attrition both sides are experiencing as the conflict settles into a grinding war of attrition.

Territorial changes in June were minimal. Ukrainian analytical outlet DeepState UA recorded a net gain of 84 km² for Russian forces, the second‑slowest advance since June 2024. The same source claims that Ukrainian forces actually liberated slightly more ground than they lost, though precise figures are withheld to protect operational security.

French OSINT analyst Clément Molin estimated Russian advances of 28 km² in June, a figure echoed by the Institute for the Study of War. Across the front, 70‑80 % of fighting is concentrated in four hotspots: Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk and Huliaipole.

In response to Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics, Moscow has intensified attacks on Ukrainian petrol stations near the front lines. The Ukrainian monitoring group Oko Gora recorded 55 attacks on fuel depots in the last ten days of June. While Kyiv argues that these strikes will not cripple its army's fuel supply, citing multiple supply routes, the attacks add another layer of pressure on a country already strained by the war.

Ukrainian analysts argue that the attacks are more symbolic than strategically decisive, aiming to sow uncertainty among civilians and to divert resources from the front. Nevertheless, the targeting of civilian infrastructure raises concerns under international humanitarian law, a point repeatedly raised by European human‑rights organisations.

Beyond kinetic strikes, the conflict has seen innovative uses of technology to influence enemy behaviour. The Ukrainian project "I Want to Live", which seeks to persuade Russian soldiers to surrender, released a short instructional video showing how a drone can signal surrender instructions. The video demonstrates a drone hovering, the soldier discarding his weapon, raising his hands and awaiting a visual cue from the drone operator.

While the practical impact of such psychological operations is difficult to measure, they reflect a broader trend of integrating artificial intelligence and autonomous systems into information warfare, a development that European security experts are monitoring closely.

The destruction of the two bridges near Mariupol illustrates a shift in the Ukrainian war effort toward cost‑effective, high‑payload UAVs capable of disrupting Russian logistics without the need for costly Western munitions. For European policymakers, the lesson is clear: supporting the development and supply of adaptable drone technology could provide allies with a flexible tool for both defence and deterrence.

At the same time, the heavy missile barrage on Kyiv underscores the persistent danger of Russian long‑range strike capabilities. Continued investment in layered air‑defence systems, as well as diplomatic pressure to curb the export of ballistic and hypersonic weapons, remains a priority for the EU and NATO.

For the people living in the contested zones of southern Ukraine, the immediate concern is the loss of vital transport links. The makeshift pontoon bridges and embankments being erected by Russian engineers are fragile, and any further Ukrainian strikes could further isolate occupied communities, exacerbate shortages of food and medical supplies, and increase civilian hardship.

As the war enters its second year, the interplay between low‑cost drone warfare, high‑tech missile attacks and the struggle for logistical supremacy will continue to shape the battlefield. European observers will be watching closely to see whether the Ukrainian model of inexpensive, high‑payload UAVs can be replicated or countered, and how the broader strategic balance will evolve in a conflict where technology and resourcefulness often outweigh sheer firepower.